

Kantian Intuitions, *A priori* Intuitions, and Trendelenburg's 'Neglected' Alternative

Micah J. Bailey

Abstract: In the expositions, Kant argues our original representations of space and time are *a priori* intuitions. From this, he concludes things in themselves are non-spatiotemporal. Famously, F.A. Trendelenburg argued Kant's argument for the non-spatiotemporality of things in themselves neglects an alternative – that space and time are both subjective and objective – and, therefore, is invalid. I argue Kant's argument is not invalid, because the nature of Kantian intuitions entails that an *a priori* intuition must refer to exclusively subjective things, which cannot be things in themselves. Moreover, the property content of the concepts of space and time (i.e. their intensions) is derived from the referents of the *a priori* intuitions of space and time, respectively. Consequently, the concepts of space and time can only take into their extensions objects that possess exclusively subjective properties, none of which things in themselves can possess.

Keywords: intuition, *a priori*, Kant, space, time, transcendental idealism, things in themselves, neglected alternative.

Word count, including abstract, footnotes, and references: 9,995.

0 Introduction

Kant argues for the non-spatiotemporality thesis: space and time are neither things in themselves, nor do things in themselves possess spatiotemporal properties (A26/B42 and A33/B49). Call the argument 'the non-spatiotemporality argument'. F.A.

Trendelenburg believed the non-spatiotemporality argument entails space and time are subjective, 'subjective' here meaning part of a sensible being's subjective constitution.

However, Trendelenburg also believed the non-spatiotemporality argument neglects to rule out an alternative: space and time are both subjective and objective. Hence, the

objection is known as the neglected alternative or Trendelenburg's gap.¹ For the neglected alternative to be applicable, 'objective' here means space and time would be things in themselves or some things in themselves possess spatiotemporal properties (hereafter, the objectivity thesis). Note the negation of the objectivity thesis and the non-spatiotemporality thesis are logically equivalent. Thus, Trendelenburg's interpretation of the non-spatiotemporality argument:

- (P1) Space and time are parts of our subjective constitution (ST).
- (I1) It is false either space and time are things in themselves or things in themselves are spatiotemporal (\sim OT). (from P1)
- (\therefore) Space and time are non-things-in-themselves, and things in themselves are non-spatiotemporal (NST). (from I1)

Without any further premises, this interpretation is guilty of neglecting Trendelenburg's alternative.

Recently, Tobias Rosefeldt has presented an intriguing solution grounded on a particular interpretation of Kant's distinction between appearances and things in themselves (hereafter, distinction_{AT}). He argues Kantian appearances are response-dependent properties that depend upon the interplay between objects and discursive cognitive faculties (hereafter, sensible response-dependent properties). In describing response-dependent properties in general, Rosefeldt's (2016: 196) says, '[b]eing poisonous is a typical response-dependent property... because to be poisonous just is to have some (e.g. chemical) property that elicits symptoms of intoxication in such-and-such organisms.' Things in themselves, then, are non-sensible-response-dependent properties of the same objects. Thus, according to Rosefeldt (2016: 195-6), the

¹ See Graham Bird (2006: 486-99) for a critical examination of Trendelenburg's neglected alternative.

spatiotemporal properties of empirical objects are sensible response-dependent properties. They are necessarily sensible response-dependent because ‘space’ and ‘time’, qua singular terms, refer to sensible response-dependent properties (Rosefeldt 2016: 192-3). This interpretation avoids Trendelenburg’s neglected alternative, since it is logically impossible for properties that are necessarily sensible response-dependent properties to also be non-sensible-response-dependent properties.

However, Rosefeldt’s solves Trendelenburg’s neglected alternative at the expense of introducing a new neglected alternative. Kant’s distinction_{AT} is justified by the same set of arguments leading to the non-spatiotemporality thesis, namely the arguments in the expositions. For it is at that point we discover the content of sensible intuitions do not include things in themselves (see A249, B306, §1.2 and §2.3). Since Kant is not simply entitled to any version of the distinction_{AT} he wants, those arguments need to also entail Rosefeldt’s specific interpretation of the distinction_{AT}. Otherwise, Kant’s purported adoption of Rosefeldt’s specific interpretation of the distinction_{AT} (1) is *ad hoc*, and (2) neglects to rule out other possible alternative versions of his distinction_{AT} – ones that do not bar things in themselves from being spatiotemporal. But Rosefeldt neither argues his interpretation of the distinction_{AT} follows from the expositions, nor is such an argument forthcoming.

In contrast, Graham Bird (2006: 495) suggests the claim our original representations of space and time are *a priori* intuitions is central in securing the non-spatiotemporality thesis. I agree. Thus, Bird and I interpret the non-spatiotemporality argument accordingly:

- (P1’) Our original representations of space and time are *a priori* intuitions
- ...
- (∴) Space and time are non-things-in-themselves, and things in themselves are non-spatiotemporal (NST)

Marcus Willaschek (1997) and Lucy Allais (2010 and 2015) argue that what I have labelled ‘the non-spatiotemporality argument’ turns on the apriority and intuitivity of our original representations of space and time. Call this kind of interpretation of the non-spatiotemporality argument ‘the intuitivity interpretation’. However, Allais obviates Trendelenburg’s neglected alternative by interpreting the intuitivity interpretation’ as arguing for a conclusion far weaker than the non-spatiotemporality thesis: ‘our representations of the structure of space and time do not present us with a mind-independent feature of reality’ (2015: 195 and 197-8). Corresponding to the strength of the conclusion, call Allais’ interpretation ‘a weak intuitivity interpretation’; call an intuitivity interpretation that concludes the non-spatiotemporality thesis ‘a strong intuitivity interpretation’.

There are substantial textual reasons for adopting the intuitivity interpretation. Namely, Kant, in the *Prolegomena* actually provides an argument intended to close Trendelenburg’s gap:

If our intuition had to be of the kind that represented things *as they are in themselves*, then absolutely no intuition *a priori* would take place, but it would always be empirical. For I can only know what may be contained in the object in itself if the object is present and given to me... but even granting [the possibility of intuiting things as they are themselves,] the intuition still would not take place *a priori*, i.e., before the objects were presented to me, for without that no basis for the relation of my representation to the object can be conceived...² (*Proleg.* 4: 282)

² Translations of the *Prolegomena*, abbreviated *Proleg.*, are Gary Hatfield’s.

Plainly, Kant is arguing for the inconceivability of *a priori* intuitions referring to things in themselves.³ He makes the same point just after announcing the non-spatiotemporality thesis:⁴

Space does not represent any property of things in themselves, nor does it represent them in their relation to one another... For no determinations, whether absolute or relative, can be intuited prior to the existence of the things to which they belong, and none, therefore, can be intuited a priori.⁵ (A26/B42; emphasis mine)

Time is not something which exists itself, or which inheres in things as an objective determination... Were it a determination or order inhering in things themselves, it could not precede the objects as their condition, and be known and intuited a priori by means of synthetic propositions. (A32-3/B49; emphasis mine)

Note, if *a priori* intuitions must refer to non-things-in-themselves, then the above argument and (P1') secures the former conjunct of (:). The only thing left to prove, then, is things in themselves cannot possess the properties that are determined by the referents of *a priori* intuitions (see §2.3).

The overarching aim of this paper is to argue for the deductive validity of the strong intuitivity interpretation, thereby showing the non-spatiotemporality argument does not neglect Trendelenburg's alternative. Weaker interpretations are unlikely given Kant's insistence on the non-spatiotemporality thesis elsewhere (e.g. B66-72 and B149). In any case, Willaschek, Allais, and I adopt the same general strategy, though I

³ Cf. Allais (2010: 64).

⁴ These additional arguments are widely overlooked. For examples, see Allais (2015: 188), Kieran Setiya (2004: 67), Lorne Falkenstein (1995: 289-93), and Henry Allison (2004: 118-32).

⁵ Translations of the *Critique of Pure Reason* are Norman Kemp Smith's. I cite it using the standard A/B pagination.

developed the strategy independent of them: (1) analyse the nature of Kantian intuitions and (2) argue, for an *a priori* representation to possess such a nature, it must refer to a non-thing-in-itself or exclusively subjective thing (i.e. a subjective and non-objective thing). Willaschek argues (1) Kantian intuitions must be caused by their referents and (2) *a priori* intuitions cannot be caused by things in themselves. Allais disagrees that *a priori* intuitions involve causal interactions with their referents. Thus, in contrast to Willaschek, she argues (1) a Kantian intuition involves the direct presence of its referent to consciousness (as opposed to its presentation through some intermediary representation caused by its referent) and (2) *a priori* intuitions cannot present things in themselves to consciousness. On my view, neither causality, nor direct presence, needs to be appealed to. Instead, I argue (1) a Kantian intuition must relate to a thing such that only it belongs to the intuition's extension and (2) that relation (whatever specific kind it is), together with the assumption of an *a priori* intuition referring to a thing in itself, generates a contradiction. Accordingly, another primary aim of the paper is to provide an analysis of Kantian intuitions. The first section is devoted to this. The second section is devoted to demonstrating the validity of the intuitivity interpretation. I turn to the first section.

1 Kantian Intuitions and Kantian Sensible Intuitions

Here, I develop the formal necessary and sufficient conditions for a representation to be an intuition (hereafter, formal conditions). I argue for two subsets of formal sufficient conditions that are mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive: the robust formal conditions and the weak formal conditions. The weak formal conditions can only be satisfied by representations that refer to weak things, things reducible to the forms or modifications of sensibility (hereafter, presentational content). The robust formal

conditions can only be satisfied by representations that refer to robust things, things not reducible to presentational content.

It is controversial whether Kantian empirical objects are weak things (e.g. are Berkeleyan objects). This controversy is logically independent from the concern of this paper. First, the possession of *some* weak properties (i.e. properties reducible to presentational content) does not entail the thing is (*entirely*) reducible to presentational content. Second, the weak and robust formal conditions can be developed without appeal to empirical objects, since clear cases of weak things and robust things can be appealed to (see §1.1.1).

However, I understand the strong intuitivity interpretation to turn on a specific interpretation of Kantian sensible intuitions: they comprise presentational content. Thus, after developing the formal conditions, I defend this interpretation of (Kantian) sensible intuitions. I now turn to developing the formal conditions.

1.1 The Formal Conditions of Kantian Intuitions

Any account of Kantian intuitions must provide an interpretation of two general criteria Kant sets out in his *Stufenleiter*. He says an intuition ‘relates immediately to the object and is single’ (A320/B377). Call the former criterion ‘the immediacy criterion’ and the latter ‘the singularity criterion’. I begin with the singularity criterion.

1.1.1 Singularity

Uncontroversially, the purpose of the singularity criterion is to ensure Kantian intuitions can have only one object in its extension.⁶ This is evidenced primarily by Kant’s

⁶ However, how Kantian intuitions succeed in securing their singularity is controversial. See Jaakko Hintikka (1969: 43), Parsons (1992: 44), Manley Thompson (1972: 332-33),

definition of ‘intuition’ in his *Stufenleiter*:

This is either *intuition* or *concept* (*intuitus vel conceptus*). The former relates immediately to the object and is single, the latter refers to it mediately by means of a feature which several things may have in common. (A320/B377)

In contrast to intuitions, concepts refer to their objects ‘by means of a feature which several things may have in common’. For illustration, consider <red>.⁷ The property content of <Red> (i.e. the content forming the intension of <red>) is shareable among numerically distinct things, for example apples, cherries, etc. Accordingly, by being red, all red objects are taken into the extension of <red>. Thus, one criterion for a representation to be a concept is multiple things can belong to its extension. Call this ‘the generality criterion’. Since Kant contrasts the singularity criterion with the generality criterion, the singularity criterion is satisfied by a representation, *r*, if *r* can have only one object in its extension.

Recall an intuition’s extension determines whether the intuition satisfies the robust formal conditions or the weak formal conditions. Correspondingly, the singularity criterion can be satisfied robustly or weakly. A representation robustly satisfies the singularity criterion if its referent is not reducible to presentational content. A representation weakly satisfies the singularity criterion if its referent is reducible to presentational content. Consider a clear situation of robust satisfaction.

Suppose a thing in itself, *t*, causes a subject’s sensibility to modify. By the intension of <thing in itself>, neither the existence of things in themselves, nor the

Robert Howell (1973: 209), Kirk Wilson (1975: 265), Houston Smit (2000: 254-6), and Allais (2015: 147)

⁷ I am following R. Lanier Anderson (2010: 75-92) in using ‘<...>’ as a device for referring to concepts. For instance, instead of writing ‘the concept of red’, I may write ‘<red>’.

properties inhering in them, depend upon a relation (or possible relation) to discursive cognitive faculties. This is what is meant by ‘transcendentally external’ (A373). Consequently, no properties of things in themselves are reducible to presentational content and, *t*, is, therefore, a robust object. Now, suppose, contra Kant’s cognitive theory, the resulting presentational content, *p*, perfectly resembles a subset of *t*’s properties. Then, the representation comprising *p*, *r*, satisfies the singularity criterion by being the effect of *t* (see A92/B124-5). That is, the causal relation provides the means by which *r* takes *t* into its extension.⁸ This suggests the following formal necessary conditions for robust satisfaction: for any representation, *r*, to strongly satisfy the singularity criterion (A) there exists a robust thing, *x*, (B) $r \neq x$, (C) *r* and *x* relate such that *x* belongs to *r*’s extension, and (D) for any *y* belonging to *r*’s extension, $y = x$.

For weak satisfaction, consider a hallucination (of a non-existent object). By the definition of ‘hallucination of a non-existent object’, the hallucination is a weak thing, since none of its parts are transcendentally external, nor does it refer to anything beyond itself. This raises two questions. Can non-referring representations be Kantian intuitions? And, if non-referring representations cannot be Kantian intuitions, can hallucinations inform us how to develop the weak formal conditions? I answer these in turn.

Some analogies exist between intuitions and singular terms.⁹ There are cases of non-referring singular terms. For instance, ‘the tallest person in the room’ ordinarily refers to one person, but it can fail to refer in certain cases: (1) two or more people in

⁸ See Kant (2009: 312-3) and (A92-3/B125-6)

⁹ Thompson (1972: 333) and Wilson (1975: 248-52) both maintain singular terms are not formal counterparts of intuitions. However, the fact disanalogies exist between singular terms and Kantian intuitions does not entail analogies do not exist. Cf. Wilson (1975: 252).

the room in question are the tallest people in the room and (2) they are the same exact height. Nevertheless, ‘the tallest person in the room’ is still considered a singular term in those cases. Likewise, it may be argued non-referring Kantian intuitions (e.g. hallucinations) can exist. However, a disanalogy between singular terms and intuitions deserves consideration. Notably, Kantian intuitions have an epistemic function in cognition, whereas singular terms do not. Specifically, sensible intuitions secure the objective validity of the synthetic judgments thought by the understanding with respect to some objects (see A8-10/B10-8 and A46-8/B64-6). Representations cannot perform this epistemic function if they are non-referring.¹⁰ Accordingly, hallucinations are not intuitions, but are illusions or figments of the brain (B69-71 and A157/B196).

Nonetheless, hallucinations still illuminate the weak formal conditions. For we can ask, given the hallucination does not refer to anything beyond itself, how could it satisfy the singularity criterion if it were a Kantian intuition? The only thing left for the hallucination to refer to is itself, either wholly or partially. In either case, its referent is reducible to its presentational content. These considerations give rise to the following formal necessary conditions for the weak satisfaction of the singularity criterion: for any representation, r , to weakly satisfy the singularity criterion (A') there exists a weak thing, x , (B') r and x relate such that x belongs to r 's extension, and (C') for any y belonging to r 's extension, $y = x$. This completes the development of the formal necessary conditions for the singularity criterion. I now turn to the immediacy criterion.

¹⁰ Cf. Hintikka (1969: 43) and Howell (1973: 208). Allais (2015: 156) also notes the epistemic function of Kantian intuitions is an essential property of them and, consequently, also maintains intuitions are object-dependent. However, she understands the object-dependence to be a function of intuitions' presentations of the objects themselves to consciousness, while I understand it to be a function of intuitions' needing to instantiate both a referential relation and an immediate relation to objects.

1.1.2 Immediacy

The immediacy criterion has spurred more controversy than the singularity criterion. Jaakko Hintikka (1969: 42) argues the immediacy criterion is merely another way of stating the singularity criterion. His argument hinges on the contrast Kant makes between intuitions and concepts in the *Stufenleiter*:

This is either *intuition* or *concept* (*intuitus vel conceptus*). The former relates immediately to the object and is single, the latter refers to it mediately by means of a feature which several things may have in common. (A320/B377)

‘By means of’, according to Hintikka (1969: 42), specifies what makes a representation mediate, namely the representing ‘of a feature which several things may have in common’. This reading reduces the mediacy criterion to the generality criterion.¹¹

¹¹ Thompson (1972: 327-33) also maintains the immediacy criterion reduces to the singularity criterion, for the objects humans have immediate cognition of fall under the forms of space and time. Smit (2000: 265) agrees the forms of space and time is what makes a Kantian intuition singular and immediate. Nevertheless, he maintains they have different meanings. Allais (2015: 147) agrees intuitions’ singularity involves spatiotemporal location. However, from a short excerpt, she argues intuitions’ singularity is entailed by their immediacy: “[I]ntuition is namely an immediate representation of an object. This latter can thus be only singular” (qtd. in Allais 2015: 158). But the former sentence is a characterization of intuitions, not just their immediacy. There, Kant says intuitions are (1) an immediate representation and (2) a representation of one (‘an’) object. Thus, the latter sentence is open to being interpreted as merely highlighting intuitions’ singularity, as opposed to a conclusion drawn from their immediacy. Wilson argues the singularity and immediacy criterion have different intensions, but are extensionally identical (1975: 248 and 265). Wilson (1975: 252-6) understands singularity in terms of a representation’s mereological structure. In contrast, immediacy is a matter of a representation’s structure being isomorphically identical with its object (i.e. spatiotemporally) (Wilson 1975: 263-5). Notice each of these interpretations of the singularity and immediacy criterion involve

Because Kant contrasts the criteria for intuitions and concepts, Hintikka further reasons the immediacy criterion, likewise, reduces to the singularity criterion. This interpretation, however, is problematic.

First, as Charles Parsons (1992: 45) notes, a definite description refers to an individual by employing several concepts together. For instance, ‘the tallest living man in the world’ employs <tallest>, <living>, <man>, <in>, and <world>, together, to form the complex abstract representation <tallest living man in the world>. <Tallest living man in the world> can only refer to one object and, at the time of writing this, actually succeeds in referring. Therefore, it satisfies the singularity criterion. Consequently, if the immediacy criterion reduces to the singularity criterion, then <tallest living man in the world> is a Kantian intuition. But, <tallest living man in the world> is uncontroversially a non-Kantian-intuition.

Second, if the immediacy criterion reduces to the singularity criterion, then <tallest living man in the world> relates immediately to its object. But, this generates a contradiction, since <tallest living man in the world> is composed of concepts, which relate to their objects mediately.

Third, there are alternative interpretations of the phrase ‘by means of a feature which several things may have in common’. Houston Smit argues Kant uses it to clarify what kind of features (i.e. Merkmale) compose concepts. Kant distinguishes between two kinds of features: intuitive features and discursive features.¹² Intuitive features are the features constitutive of an intuition and are singular instances of an

space and time. Consequently, all of them incorrectly exclude the intuitions of an intuitive intellect from being Kantian intuitions (see §1.1.4).

¹² See Smit (2000: 254-260) for a discussion on intuitive features (Merkmale) and discursive features.

abstract property. For instance, the bits of red included in an intuition of an apple are intuitive features. In contrast, discursive features correspond to the property contents of concepts. For instance, <bachelor> is composed of the property contents expressed by <adult>, <male>, and <unmarried>, making those property contents discursive features of <bachelor>. Instead of being singular instances, discursive features are universals. Thus, according to Smit, the above phrase specifies concepts as comprising discursive features, not intuitive features. Consequently, Smit (2000: 261) says, ‘The import of the phrase is to specify what the generality, not the mediacy, of a concept consists in’.

Lastly, I agree with Smit that Kant uses the above phrase to specify what makes a concept general, but for a different reason. Namely, Kant is, elsewhere, clear about what makes intuitions immediate and concepts mediate:

[I]ntuition is that [mode of knowledge] through which it is in immediate relation to them, and to which all thought as a means is directed... Objects are *given* to us by means of sensibility... they are *thought* through the understanding, and from the understanding arise *concepts*. But all thought must, directly or indirectly, by way of certain characters, relate ultimately to intuitions... (A19/B33)

Now the only use which the understanding can make of these concepts is to judge by means of them. Since no representation, save when it is an intuition, is in immediate relation to an object, no concept is ever related to an object immediately, but to some other representation of it... Judgment is therefore the mediate knowledge of an object... In every judgment there is a concept which holds of many representations, and among them of a given representation that is immediately related to an object. (A68/B93)

In the former passage, Kant asserts all thought must ultimately relate to sensible intuitions. The scope of the claim is limited to objects of sensible cognition, since things in themselves and noumena are thinkable according to Kant, but are not sensibly intuitable (Bxxvi-Bxxvii). Note, thoughts are composed of concepts. Thus, Kant is

saying the sensible cognition of an object requires the relation of concepts to sensible intuitions. The passage suggests why earlier: only intuitions, through their immediate relation with their objects, give our cognitive faculties the objects thought and, thereby, sensibly cognized. That is, for the understanding to perform an actual application of a concept to one of the concept's objects, it requires sensible intuitions as an epistemic medium to those objects. The mediacy of concepts, then, is characterized by the fact an actual application of a concept involves the concept being mediated through an intuition to one of its objects. As Smit (2000: 263) notes, 'the mediacy of a concept's relation to an object consists in its relating to an object by means of a further representation of that object.' Ultimately, however, for the actual application of a concept to occur, the concept must relate to an intuition. The latter passage reinforces this point in maintaining (1) only intuitions relate immediately to objects, (2) concepts must relate to a representation of the object, (3) judgments, which are composed of concepts, are mediate cognitions of objects, and (4) a judgment, in order to be a cognition of an object, must eventually relate, and hold of, an intuition of that object. Thus, contra Hintikka, what makes a representation mediate is the manner by which it is possible for it to relate to its objects.

Of course, the generality of concepts plays a role in making a concept's mediacy possible. After all, the understanding needs a mechanism by which it correctly selects concepts for a judgment about an object that are actually objectively valid of that object. I submit the understanding succeeds in this by gauging whether the discursive features of the concepts correspond to the intuitive features of the intuition of the object in question. Accordingly, 'by means of' in the phrase 'by means of a feature which several things may have in common' reads as Kant specifying *part of the manner* by which the mediacy takes place, not *what* makes a representation mediate. This is

further supported when Kant says, ‘all thought must... *by way of certain characters* (*Merkmale*), relate ultimately to intuitions’ (emphasis mine).

I now turn to developing the formal necessary conditions for the satisfaction of the immediacy criterion. We have seen Kant assigns intuitions an epistemic function in the sensible cognition of objects. Namely, it mediates the concepts composing a judgment (or thought) to one of their objects, thereby allowing the understanding to (1) perform an actual application of those concepts to the object in question and, in doing so, (2) correctly identify, through the intuition’s immediate relation, the objective validity of the concepts composing the judgment with respect to the object. However, in developing the formal conditions, we must be careful not to exclude the intuitions achieved by an intuitive intellect (hereafter active intuitions) from being Kantian intuitions. Active intuitions, on Kant’s theory, enable the cognition of objects without presentational content or the actual application of concepts to objects. Thus, both active and sensible intuitions, through an immediate relation with their objects, serve as epistemic mediums that enable a subject to cognize their objects. Active intuitions are sufficient for the cognition of an object, whereas sensible intuitions are merely necessary for sensible cognition. We have also seen the singularity criterion, by itself, does not secure that a representation satisfying it performs the above epistemic function of Kantian intuitions. For instance, <tallest living man in the world> satisfies the singularity criterion (at the time of this being written), but does not, by itself, enable any synthetic cognitions of the tallest living man in the world. The satisfaction of the immediacy criterion, then, bears the burden of guaranteeing this epistemic function. These considerations suggest the following formal conditions for the satisfaction of the immediacy criterion: for any representation, r , to satisfy the immediacy criterion (A) there exists a thing, x , and (B) r relates to x such that (Bi) r can serve as an epistemic

medium between x and a subject's cognitive faculties, thereby making it epistemically determinable whether x belongs to the extensions of the concepts belonging to some set of concepts, k , or (Bii) r is an epistemic medium between x and a subject's cognitive faculties in that the subject cognizes x through r without the application of any concept, c .

1.1.3 The Formal Necessary and Sufficient Conditions

I can now develop a set of formal *necessary* conditions for a representation to be an intuition, but my aim is to develop their *necessary and sufficient* conditions. I turn to that here.

On my view, the singularity and immediacy criteria are independent necessary conditions for a representation, r , to be a Kantian intuition – neither, by themselves, are sufficient. The satisfaction of the singularity criterion is required for a representation to be a Kantian intuition, because (1) a Kantian intuition is a representation *of*, or *about*, an individual and (2) a representation cannot be of, or about, an individual without taking it into its extension. However, as we have seen, Kantian intuitions also have a specific kind of epistemic function, which the singularity criterion cannot, by itself, secure (§1.1.2). Likewise, the immediacy criterion is required for a representation to be a Kantian intuition, because a Kantian intuition serves as an epistemic medium that enables a subject to cognize the intuited object. But the immediacy criterion is not sufficient for a representation to be a Kantian intuition, at least in the case of discursive cognizers. For there are plausible cases in which a set of presentational content instantiates the requisite relation with an individual, thereby serving as an epistemic medium that enables a subject to cognize that individual, but the subject, for some reason, fails to make use of that epistemic medium; for instance, when the subject focuses her attention on a different set of presentational content, is delirious, on drugs,

etc. Thus, on my view, the singularity and immediacy criteria are jointly sufficient conditions for a representation, r , to be an intuition, so long as the sameness proviso is met – i.e. the individual referred to by r is the same individual to which r serves as an epistemic medium. This is because, for any representation satisfying both criteria and the sameness proviso, it not only instantiates the requisite relation for performing the epistemic function Kant assigns to intuitions (i.e. the immediate relation), but, because it refers to the very individual it is in an immediate relation to, it succeeds in utilizing that immediate relation for the performance of its epistemic function. The sameness proviso is needed to preclude logically possible cases in which a representation comprising a set of presentational content immediately relates to one individual, yet refers to another. Perhaps these cases actually occur. For instance, when I thinking of one person just before seeing another who closely resembles here, for a brief moment it seems I am seeing the person I am thinking of, not the person I am seeing. It is not entirely implausible to think, during that moment, my representation refers to the person thought, even though it is immediately related to the person seen.

I can now give the formal conditions for any representation to be an intuition: a representation, r , is an intuition if and only if either (A) there exists a robust thing, x , (B) $r \neq x$, (C) r and x relate such that x belongs to r 's extension, and (D) r relates to x such that (Di) r can serve as an epistemic medium between x and a subject's cognitive faculties, thereby making it epistemically determinable whether x belongs to the extensions of the concepts belonging to some set of concepts, k , or (Dii) r is an epistemic medium between x and a subject's cognitive faculties in that the subject cognizes x through r without the application of any concept, c , and (E) for any y belonging to r 's extension, $y = x$, or (A') there exists a weak thing, x , (B') r and x relate such that x belongs to r 's extension (e.g. by some identity relation), (C') r relates to x

such that (Ci') r can serve as an epistemic medium between x and a subject's cognitive faculties, thereby making it epistemically determinable whether x belongs to the extensions of the concepts belonging to some set of concepts, k , or (Cii') r is an epistemic medium between x and a subject's cognitive faculties in that the subject cognizes x through r without the application of any concept, c , and (D') for any y belonging to r 's extension, $y = x$.

1.1.4 Contributions and Advantages

Before turning to demonstrate the validity of the strong intuitivity interpretation, I want to highlight the unique contributions my analysis adds to the secondary literature on Kantian intuitions. I also want to note the practical advantage it has over Allais' analysis in terms of advancing the intuitivity interpretation. I consider these in turn.

I want to highlight two unique contributions. First, I develop the formal conditions of *Kantian intuitions in general*. Most commentators, in using (*Kantian human sensible intuitions*) as paradigmatic examples of Kantian intuitions, have developed analyses of Kantian intuitions that incorrectly exclude some kinds of Kantian intuitions from being Kantian intuitions.¹³ Take Allais' interpretation of the singularity criteria for example:

¹³ For commentators who appeal to spatiotemporality in their interpretations of the singularity and immediacy criteria, see Thompson (1972: 327-33), Wilson (1975: 252-6), Smit (2000: 265) and Allais (2015: 147). Howell (1973: 209) explicitly asserts Kantian intuitions are sensible in nature, thereby incorrectly excluding active intuitions. In contrast, Parsons (1992: 44) appeals to imagistic perception in his interpretation of intuitions' immediacy. It seems unlikely active perceptions involve images, since they certainly do not involve sensations. Thus, Parsons' interpretation, at a minimum, fails to capture what is essential to intuitions' immediacy. Hintikka is not guilty of either. However, I argued extensively against his interpretation of the criteria in §1.1.2

First, singularity: to say that intuitions present us with *particulars* is to say that a subject who has an outer intuition has awareness of some thing outside of and other than themselves, and that the subject is in a position to perceptually discriminate this thing: to perceive it as distinct from other things and from the background. Kant thinks that this involves (at least) representing it as spatio-temporally located and spatio-temporally related to other things. (Allais 2015: 147)

Allais' inclusion of spatiotemporal location, and spatiotemporal relation to other things, incorrectly excludes active intuitions from being Kantian intuitions. For, on Kant's view, active intuitions represent their objects as they are in themselves, which, by the non-spatiotemporality thesis, means these objects neither have spatiotemporal location, nor have spatiotemporally relation to other things. Moreover, if the forms of non-human sensibility can be something different from space and time, then, requiring Kantian intuitions to represent objects spatiotemporally would also incorrectly exclude them. In contrast, my analysis is general enough so as to correctly include human sensible intuitions, non-human intuitions, and active intuitions. Second, my analysis of Kantian intuitions takes a unique position on how the singularity and immediacy criteria relate. Some commentators take them to be two ways expressing the same criterion.¹⁴ Others view one criterion entailing the other.¹⁵ And even others view the criteria to be mutually entailing.¹⁶ I am the only commentator who argues they are (1) logically independent, necessary conditions for a representation to be a Kantian intuition and (2)

¹⁴ See Hintikka (1969: 42) and Thompson (1972: 333). Allais (2015: 158) sometimes seems to take this position, as she seems to equate the two criteria: '[u]nderstanding the singularity and immediacy of intuitions as saying that intuitions present us with particulars...'

¹⁵ See Parsons (1992: 45). Allais (2015: 158) sometimes seems to take this position, as she argues intuitions' singularity follows from their immediacy.

¹⁶ See Wilson (1975: 265) and Smit (2000: 265).

with the sameness proviso met, jointly sufficient.¹⁷ I now turn to the practical advantage my analysis of Kantian intuitions has.

Allais' and my analyses of the intuitivity interpretation both hinge on the nature of Kantian intuitions. The fact Allais' interpretation of the singularity and immediacy criteria is too narrow is not, by itself, fatal to her understanding of the intuitivity interpretation. After all, *a priori* intuitions are sensible intuitions and Allais' interpretation of the singularity and immediacy criteria plausibly includes human sensible intuitions. However, Allais embeds controversial stances in her analysis that, consequently, raises undue risks that could discourage other commentators from adopting the intuitivity interpretation. For instance, Allais argues Kantian intuitions acquaint subjects with objects. As I understand her, 'acquaintance' (and its cognates) is a technical term, such that acquaintance involves the presentation of an object to consciousness as a necessary condition for the understanding to perform an actual application of concepts to anything qua sensibility (Allais 2015:147-8,155-9, and 163). Thus, Allais' analysis of Kantian intuitions entails Kant is a non-conceptualist, for it entails sensible intuitions of objects occur without the conceptualization of any sensible material.¹⁸ Traditionally, however, Kant has been interpreted as being a conceptualist – as maintaining sensible intuitions of objects depend upon the conceptual contributions

¹⁷ Cf. Howell (1973: 209). Howell may seem to take the same position as me, but he merely argues that intuitions' singularity and immediacy have distinct meanings. For he seems to agree with Parsons, contra Hintikka, that singularity follows from immediacy, but not vice versa (Howell 1973: 209-11).

¹⁸ For examples of non-conceptualist readings of Kant, see Robert Hanna (2005) and Allais (2009 and 2015).

from the understanding.¹⁹ Or take another controversial stance. Allais maintains Kantian intuitions, qua representations, do not serve as intermediaries between our consciousness and objects through which we have indirect epistemic access to those objects; that is, Kant is not an indirect realist. Instead, intuitions, qua representations, present the objects themselves directly to consciousness. Irrespective of whether Allais is correct, this part of her analysis of Kantian intuitions will certainly prove controversial. For instance, she must be able to explain how sensible intuitions present the objects themselves to consciousness without presenting objects in themselves (i.e. without presenting things in themselves). And, while her interpretation of appearances (in the transcendental sense) may very well meet this requirement, that interpretation itself is controversial.

The generality of my analysis allows it to be neutral with respect to these controversial stances. It neither entails sensible material must be conceptualized to be a sensible intuition, nor does it preclude it. Moreover, it accommodates several interpretations of Kantian appearances. Thus, my analysis does not needlessly discourage conceptualists from adopting the intuitivity interpretation, nor does it needlessly discourage those who disagree with Allais' interpretation of appearances.

1.2 Kantian Sensible Intuitions and Presentational Content

Nevertheless, the strong intuitivity interpretation, as I understand it, depends upon a

¹⁹ For examples of conceptualist readings of Kant, see Falkenstein (2006), Hannah Ginsborg (2008), and Aaron Griffith (2010).

feature peculiar to sensible intuitions: that they comprise presentational content.²⁰

Many commentators interpret Kant as both a direct realist and a non-phenomenologist.²¹

It is difficult to see how this can be, if the representation immediately relating a subject's cognitive faculties to an object comprises presentational content. Nonetheless, Kant is clearly committed to the latter. First, that things in themselves cannot be the content of sensible intuitions is a consequence of the expositions:

Even if we could bring our intuition to the highest degree of clearness, we should not thereby come any nearer to the constitution of objects in themselves.
(A43/B60)

The concept of sensibility and appearance would be falsified... if we were to accept the view that our entire sensibility is nothing but a confused representation of things, containing only what belongs to them in themselves... For the difference between a confused and a clear representation is merely logical, and does not concern the content. (A43/B60-1)

Instead, the content of sensible intuitions, fundamentally speaking, is presentational content:

[A]ll sensitive apprehension depends upon the special nature of the subject, in so far as it is capable of being modified in diverse ways by the presence of objects; and these modifications may differ in different subjects...²² (*Diss.* 2: 392-3)
We should still know only our mode of intuition, that is, our sensibility.
(A43/B60)

²⁰ In contrast, Allais maintains intuitions comprise the object itself (Allais 2015: 197). My analysis of Kantian intuitions does not rule this possibility out; for example, if objects of sensible cognition are phenomenological objects. But neither does it insist on it.

²¹ For direct realist, non-phenomenalist readings, see Allison (2004) and Allais (2004). For phenomenalist readings, see Paul Guyer (1987) and James Van Cleve (1999).

²² Translations of Kant's *Inaugural Dissertation*, abbreviated *Diss.*, are John Handyside's.

We then realise that not only are the drops of rain mere appearances, but that even their round shape, nay even the space in which they fall, are nothing in themselves, but merely modifications or fundamental forms of our sensible intuition (A46/B63).

Consequently, even though sensibility enables our cognition of appearances, appearances, fundamentally speaking, reflect the structure and content of something exclusively subjective – the phenomenal operations of our minds. This is precisely why Kant calls sensible objects ‘appearances’: [i]t is clear, therefore, that things sensitively apprehended are representations of things *as they appear...* (*Diss.* 2: 392-3). Thus, irrespective of whether it can be reconciled with viewing Kant as a non-phenomenological direct realist, Kantian sensible intuitions comprise presentational content. I now turn to demonstrating the validity of the strong intuitivity interpretation.

2 Proving the Validity of the Strong Intuitivity Interpretation

Because the neglected alternative is a challenge to the non-spatiotemporality argument’s validity, I have chosen to present my arguments in as fine-grained detail as I can, so as to remove as much doubt as possible from the validity of the strong intuitivity interpretation. First, I argue *a priori* intuitions can satisfy the formal conditions only by satisfying the weak formal conditions (conditions A'-D' in §1.1.3). Second, I argue for the identity thesis: if *x* is sensibly intuited *a priori* (i.e. we have a sensible *a priori* intuition of *x*), then *x* is reducible to the presentational content the *a priori* intuition comprises. Third, I argue for the exclusive subjectivity thesis: if *x* is sensibly intuited *a priori* and reducible to presentational content, then *x* is a non-thing-in-itself and things in themselves are non-*x*-property-having. Finally, I demonstrate the validity of the strong intuitivity interpretation.

2.1 *A priori Intuitions and the Weak Formal Conditions*

A priori intuitions, by hypothesis, are intuitions and, therefore, either satisfy the robust formal conditions (conditions A-E in §1.1.3) or the weak formal conditions. But Kant argues it is inconceivable (i.e. generates a contradiction) for *a priori* intuitions to satisfy the robust formal conditions:

If our intuition had to be of the kind that represented things *as they are in themselves*, then absolutely no intuition *a priori* would take place, but it would always be empirical. For I can only know what may be contained in the object in itself if the object is present and given to me. Of course, even then it is incomprehensible how the intuition of a thing that is present should allow me to cognize it the way it is in itself, since its properties cannot migrate over into my power of representation; but even granting such a possibility, the intuition still would not take place *a priori*, i.e., before the objects were presented to me, for without that no basis for the relation of my representation to the object can be conceived... (*Proleg.* 4: 282)

Here is how I understand Kant's train of thought. Assume any *a priori* intuition, *i*, satisfies the robust formal conditions. From conditions (A) and (C), *i* must take a robust thing into its extension. There are only two plausible candidates for robust things: sensible empirical objects and things in themselves. Assume *i* takes any sensible empirical object, *e*, into its extension. By the definition of 'empirical object', *i* is an empirical representation. But, under our assumption, *i* is an *a priori* and, therefore, non-empirical representation. Hence, under the governing assumptions, *i* is both an empirical and non-empirical representation – a contradiction. Assume, instead, *i* takes any thing in itself, *t*, into its extension. First, if *i* is an intuition of *t*, then the presentational content *i* comprises fully resembles some set of the properties inhering in *t*. Otherwise, *i* is an intuition of an appearance, which is a non-thing-in-itself, and, under the governing assumptions, *t* would be both a thing in itself and a non-thing-in-

itself – a contradiction. Second, the resemblance relation between *i*'s presentational content and *t* can occur either accidentally (i.e. coincidentally) or non-accidentally (i.e. non-coincidentally). Assume *i*'s presentational content accidentally resembles *t*. It follows *i*, qua representation, is not *of*, or *about*, *t* and, therefore, does not refer to *t*. For illustration, suppose, by pure accident, I paint a hyper-realistic painting completely resembling Jane Doe. The resemblance relation notwithstanding, my painting does not refer to Jane Doe, since the painting is not *about* her. But, if *i* does not refer to *t*, then *i* and *t*, together, do not satisfy conditions (C) or (B') and *i* is, therefore, not an intuition of *t*. But, by the formal conditions, (C) or (B') must be satisfied by *i* and *t*, together, for *i* to be an intuition of *t*. Therefore, under the governing assumptions, *i* is, and is not, an intuition of *t* – a contradiction. Thus, assume, instead, *i*'s presentational content non-accidentally resembles *t*. From the definition of 'non-accidental', some determining relation, R, must have made *i*'s presentational content and *t* resemble. There are five possible cases of such a determining relation, R: (1) the discursive cognitive faculties determine *t*'s properties (thereby instantiating the resemblance relation), (2) *t* determines the discursive cognitive faculties, (3) the subject's discursive faculties and *t* mutually determine one another, (4) some third party, or third parties, determine either the discursive cognitive faculties or *t*, and (5) *i*'s presentational content is a descriptive content, of the same kind expressed by definite descriptions, through which the resemblance relation is ensured. Cases (1) and (3) entail some properties of *t* are determined by a relation to discursive cognitive faculties. Thus, by the intension of <thing in itself>, cases (1) and (3) entail *t* is non-transcendentally-external. But, by the intension of <thing in itself>, and the governing assumption *t* is a thing in itself, *t* is transcendentally external. Therefore, *t* is transcendentally external and non-transcendentally-external – a contradiction. In cases (2) and (4), the resemblance

relation is determined by something transcendently external to the discursive cognitive faculties in question. Thus, *i*, in cases (2) and (4), satisfy the definition of ‘empirical representation’, no matter the specific kind of determining relation in question (e.g. a causal relation). But, under the governing assumptions, *i* is an *a priori* representation and, therefore, a non-empirical representation. Hence, *i* is an empirical and non-empirical representation – a contradiction. In case (5) *i* secures *t* as its referent merely through descriptive content. But, since that descriptive content merely expresses a complex abstract representation (e.g. <tallest living man in the world>), *i* is merely a mediate representation that cannot serve as an epistemic medium to its object. But, then, *i* does not satisfy conditions (D) or (C’) and, therefore, is not an intuition. Thus, in case (5), under the governing assumptions, *i* is, and is not, an intuition – a contradiction. The foregoing demonstrates a contradiction is generated from assuming *i* satisfies the robust formal conditions. The satisfaction of the robust formal conditions by an *a priori* intuition is, therefore, logically impossible. Hence, *a priori* intuitions must satisfy the weak formal conditions. I now turn to arguing for the identity thesis.

2.2 A priori Intuitions and the Identity Thesis

The identity thesis is grounded by the foregoing argument (in §2.1) and serves as a missing premise bridging Trendelenburg’s gap. The identity thesis states if *x* is sensibly intuited *a priori* (i.e. we have a sensible *a priori* intuition of *x*), then *x* is reducible to the presentational content that *a priori* intuition comprises. Accordingly, assume its antecedent: *x* is sensibly intuited *a priori*. From §2.1, the *a priori* intuition of *x* must satisfy the weak formal conditions. From condition (A’), *x* must be a weak thing. And, by the definition of ‘weak thing’, *x* is reducible to presentational content. Now, because all *a priori* intuitions are sensible intuitions, the *a priori* intuition of *x* satisfies

conditions (C') by satisfying (Ci'). By (Ci'), the *a priori* intuition of x is an epistemic medium between something reducible to presentational content (e.g. x) and a subject's cognitive faculties. There are three possible cases for this something: the intuition of x , comprising a presentational content, p , refers to a presentational content, p' , such that (1) $p \neq p'$ and p and p' have no overlapping parts, (2) $p \neq p'$, p and p' have overlapping parts and non-overlapping parts, or (3) p' parts are a subset of p 's parts. Reflection on our cognitive faculties does not reveal any naturally occurring intuitions corresponding to cases (1) and (2). For the only plausible cases of intuitions referring to the presentational content of other intuitions, wholly or partially, are intuitions of referring objects, such as signs, portraits, etc. But all referring objects are artefacts and, therefore, are non-naturally occurring. In contrast, the referents of *a priori* intuitions are never artefacts, as all intuitions of artefacts must be empirical. Consequently, all intuitions must refer to some subset of its own presentational content, and the consequent of the intuitivity thesis follows: x is reducible to the presentational content the *a priori* intuition of x comprises. Therefore, Kant is entitled to the identity thesis.

I have left the specific kind (i.e. strength) of the identity relation here somewhat indeterminate. However, all possible candidates are reducible to presentational content, which is sufficiently strong for my purposes. Thus, I do not take up determining the precise kind, or strength, of the identity relation in question.

2.3 *A priori Intuitions and the Exclusive Subjectivity Thesis*

The exclusive subjectivity thesis is grounded by the formal conditions (§1.1.3) and §2.2, and it serves as a missing premise bridging Trendelenburg's gap. The exclusive subjectivity thesis states if x is sensibly intuited *a priori* and reducible to presentational content, then x is a non-thing-in-itself and things in themselves are non- x -property-

having. Accordingly, assume its antecedent: x is sensibly intuited *a priori* and reducible to presentational content. By the conditions (C), (B'), and the sameness proviso, x is the referent of the *a priori* intuition in question. By our assumption, the referent of the *a priori* intuition in question is reducible to presentational content. Therefore, by the definition of 'presentational content' (see §1.2), x is non-transcendentally external. Since all things in themselves are transcendentally external, x is a non-thing-in-itself – this is one conjunct of the consequent of the exclusive subjectivity thesis. Now, assume any thing in itself, t , is x -property-having (e.g. if x is space, then x -property-having would be being-spatial). Because x is the referent of the *a priori* intuition in question, and because of the conceptual relation between x and x -property-having, x is the standard by which it is true whether something is x -property-having. For instance, it is the referent of the *a priori* intuition of space that determines whether something is spatial, for (1) the referent of the *a priori* intuition of space is space, (2) the intension of <space> is derived from space, and, therefore, (3) space determines whether something is spatial. Accordingly, since an essential (i.e. necessary) property of x is being non-transcendentally-external, t is x -property-having only if t possesses a non-transcendentally-external property. Consequently, t possesses a non-transcendentally-external property. But, by the intension of <thing in itself>, t is transcendentally external and, therefore, possesses no non-transcendentally-external properties. Thus, t possesses, and does not possess, non-transcendentally-external properties – a contradiction. Accordingly, the other conjunct of the exclusive subjectivity thesis follows: things in themselves are non- x -property-having. Hence, its consequent follows: x is a non-thing-in-itself and things in themselves are non- x -property-having. Kant is entitled to the exclusive subjectivity thesis.

Rosefeldt (2016: 188-92) argues against the above strategy, maintaining it secures x is a non-thing-in-itself, but not things in themselves are non- x -property-having. As Rosefeldt sees it, the above strategy secures the former by assuming Kant is a semantic externalist about singular terms, in which case ‘ x ’ must refer to an exclusively subjective thing. However, the question of whether things in themselves are x -property-having is putatively divorced from what ‘ x ’ refers to, because the property contents of concepts are expressed by general terms, not singular terms. Moreover, as Kant maintains, a thing belongs to a concept’s extension merely by possessing the concept’s property content. Thus, it seems to Rosefeldt (2016: 191), that unless we attribute to Kant a semantic externalism about general terms, in violation of Kant’s stance on how concepts’ extensions are determined, things in themselves could still fall under $\langle x$ -property-having \rangle even though x is exclusively subjective. And, furthermore, according to Rosefeldt (2016: 191), attributing a semantic externalism about general terms also entails the possibility of empirical concepts expressing properties of things in themselves; specifically, if a consistent causal relation between a set of properties of things in themselves and a set of presentational content were to obtain. But Kant does not allow for the possibility that things in themselves belong to the extensions of empirical concepts.

Rosefeldt’s objection is misguided. For Kant, the intension of ‘ x ’ qua general term (i.e. the property content of $\langle x$ -property-having \rangle) is determined by the properties of the referent of ‘ x ’ qua singular term. For instance, in the expositions, Kant argues spaces and $\langle \text{space} \rangle$ are derived from space, the infinite magnitude given in *a priori* intuition (A25/B39). As such, the property content of $\langle \text{space} \rangle$ is determined by our *a priori* intuition of space. This is no different from the property content of $\langle \text{red} \rangle$ being determined by the empirical intuition of red from which $\langle \text{red} \rangle$ was first derived.

Consequently, part of the property content of <space> involves the essential properties of space, including its exclusive subjectiveness. This is precisely how Kant argues:

[The spatial] predicate can be ascribed to things only in so far as they appear to us, that is, only to objects of sensibility. The constant form of this receptivity, which we term sensibility, is a necessary condition of all the relations in which objects can be intuited as outside us; and if we abstract from these objects, it is a pure intuition, and bears the name space. (A27/B43)

It is wrong to attribute spatiality to things in themselves, because (1) 'space' names the referent of the *a priori* intuition of space, (2) 'spatiality' derives its meaning from 'space' and, thereby, what 'space' names, and (3) space is something that is exclusively subjective (i.e. the form of sensibility – a kind of presentational content). Accordingly, to attribute spatiality to things in themselves is to attribute an exclusively subjective property to them, which is contradictory – that, or 'spatial' is a gross misnomer.

Mutatis mutandis for time (A31-2/B47). This is the same sort of reason why things in themselves cannot belong to the extensions of empirical concepts. First, all empirical intuitions are structured by exclusively subjective things, space and time, and are, thereby, infected with their exclusive subjectiveness (A24/B38-9 and A31/B46).

Second, empirical intuitions, qua representations, partially comprise sensations, which are exclusively subjective. Consequently, the property content of empirical concepts includes exclusively subjectiveness, since all empirical concepts are derived from empirical intuitions. Therefore, things in themselves are excluded from empirical concepts' extensions. And, hence, semantic externalism about general terms does not need to be appealed to.

2.4 The Validity of the Strong Intuitivity Interpretation

I can now supply the missing premises of the strong intuitivity interpretation and prove

its validity.²³

- (P1') Our original representations of space and time are *a priori* intuitions
- (P2') If x is sensibly intuited *a priori*, then x is reducible to the presentational content of that *a priori* intuition (IT)
- (P3') If x is sensibly intuited *a priori* and reducible to presentational content, then x is a non-thing-in-itself and things in themselves are non- x -property-having (EST)
- (∴) Space and time are non-things-in-themselves, and things in themselves are non-spatiotemporal (NST).

Kant argues for (P1') in the expositions. (P2') is the identity thesis, which I argued for in §2.2. (P3') is the exclusive subjectivity thesis, which I argued for in §2.3. And (∴) is the non-spatiotemporality thesis – the conclusion of the non-spatiotemporality argument.

The strong intuitivity interpretation is clearly valid. From (P1') and (P2'), it follows, (I1'), space and time are reducible to the presentational content the *a priori* intuitions of space and time comprise, respectively. From (P1'), (P3'), and (I1'), it follows, (∴), space and time are non-things-in-themselves and things in themselves are non-spatiotemporal. Hence, the strong intuitivity interpretation should be adopted as the correct interpretation of the non-spatiotemporality argument. Trendelenburg's alternative is not neglected.

2.5 Advantages of the Strong Intuitivity Interpretation

Before concluding this paper, I want to highlight the advantages my analysis has over Allais'. First, Trendelenburg's neglected alternative is an objection against the validity of the non-spatiotemporality argument. My analysis of the intuitivity interpretation

²³ For Allais' understanding of the intuitivity interpretation, see (2015: 195)

offers fine-grained arguments for (P2'), (P3'), and (:.), so as to remove as much doubt as possible from the validity of the intuitivity interpretation. Second, Allais' interpretation of what I have called 'the non-spatiotemporality argument' has it arguing for a conclusion substantially weaker than the non-spatiotemporality thesis: our representations of the structure of space and time do not present us with a mind-independent feature of reality. In contrast, my analysis secures the non-spatiotemporality thesis, which Kant insists upon throughout the *Critique of Pure Reason*. Lastly, the non-spatiotemporality thesis constitutes synthetic *a priori* knowledge of things in themselves, which seems to violate Kant's insistence of the impossibility of synthetic sensible cognition of things in themselves. On my view, Kant's general theory of human knowledge allows for synthetic *a priori* knowledge of things in themselves consistently with his specific theory of human cognition, but only if (1) that synthetic *a priori* knowledge is acquired via logical entailment and (2) its logical entailment traces back to a set of epistemically justified propositions consisting, minimally, of analytic truths of things in themselves (justified via conceptual analysis) and synthetic *a priori* knowledge of our cognitive faculties (via transcendental philosophy). Although I cannot make the case for this view here, I do note the strong intuitivity interpretation conforms to it. (P1') is a synthetic *a priori* claim about our cognitive faculties epistemically justified via transcendental philosophy. (P2') and (P3') are undergirded by the logical consequence of analytic truths of things in themselves, Kantian intuitions, and sensible intuitions.

Bibliography

Allais, Lucy. 'Kant's One World: Interpreting 'Transcendental Idealism'.' *British Journal for the History of Philosophy* 12, no. 4 (2004): 655-84.

- . ‘Kant, Non-conceptual Content, and the Representation of Space.’ *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 47 no. 3 (2009): 383-413.
- . ‘Kant's Argument for Transcendental Idealism in the Transcendental Aesthetic.’ *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 90, no. 1 (2010): 47-75.
- . *Manifest Reality*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015.
- Allison, Henry E. *Kant's Transcendental Idealism*. Rev. and enl. London: Yale University Press, 2004.
- Anderson, R. Lanier. ‘The Introduction to the Critique: Framing the Question.’ In *The Cambridge Companion to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*, edited by Paul Guyer, 75-92. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010.
- Bird, Graham. ‘The Neglected Alternative: Trendelenburg, Fischer, and Kant.’ In *A Companion to Kant*, edited by Graham Bird, 486-499. Oxford: Blackwell, 2006.
- Falkenstein, Lorne. *Kant's Intuitionism: a Commentary on the Transcendental Aesthetic*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1995.
- . ‘Kant's Transcendental Aesthetic.’ In *A Companion to Kant*, edited by Graham Bird, 140-53. Oxford: Blackwell, 2006.
- Ginsborg, Hannah. ‘Was Kant a Nonconceptualist?’ *Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition* 137, no. 1 (2008): 65-77.
- Griffith, Aaron. ‘Perception and the Categories: A Conceptualist Reading of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason.’ *European Journal of Philosophy* 20, no. 2 (2010): 193-222.
- Guyer, Paul. *Kant and the Claims of Knowledge*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987.
- Hanna, Robert. ‘Kant and Nonconceptual Content.’ *European Journal of Philosophy* 13, no. 2 (2005): 247-90.
- Hintikka, Jaakko. ‘On Kant's Notion of Intuition (Anschauung).’ In *The First Critique: Reflections on Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*, edited by Terence Penelhum and J.J. MacIntosh, 38-53. Belmont, Cal.: Wadsworth, 1969.

- Howell, Robert. 'Intuition, Synthesis, and Individuation in the Critique of Pure Reason.' *Noûs* 7, no. 3 (1973): 207-32.
- Kant, Immanuel. 'De Mundi Sensibilis atque Intelligibilis Forma et Principiis.' In *Kant's Inaugural Dissertation and Early Writings on Space*, by John Handyside. Chicago: Open Court, 1929.
- . *Critique of Pure Reason*. Rev. 2nd. Translated by Norman Kemp Smith. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007.
- . *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics*. Edited by Gary Hatfield. Translated by Gary Hatfield. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.
- . *Kant's Critique of Pure Reason: Background Source Materials*. Edited by Eric Watkins. Translated by Eric Watkins. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009.
- Parsons, Charles. 'Kant's Philosophy of Arithmetic.' In *Kant's Philosophy of Mathematics*, edited by Carl J. Posy, 43-79. Norwell, Mass: Kluwer Academic, 1992.
- Rosefeldt, Tobias. 'Closing the Gap: a New Answer to an Old Objection against Kant's Argument for Transcendental Idealism.' *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 116, no. 2 (2016): 181-203.
- Setiya, Kieran. 'Transcendental Idealism in the 'Aesthetic'.' *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 68 (1) (2004): 63-88.
- Smit, Houston. 'Kant on Marks and the Immediacy of Intuition.' *The Philosophical Review* 109, no. 2 (2000): 235-66.
- Thompson, Manley. 'Singular Terms and Intuitions in Kant's Epistemology.' *The Review of Metaphysics* 26, no. 2 (1972): 314-43.
- Van Cleve, James. *Problems from Kant*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1999.
- Willaschek, Marcus. 'Der transzendente Idealismus und die Idealität von Raum und Zeit.' *Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung* 51 (1997) : 537-64.
- Wilson, Kirk. 'Kant on Intuition.' *The Philosophical Quarterly* 25, no. 100 (1975): 247-65.