“Kant’s Theory of Knowledge and the Unknowability of the Existence of Things in Themselves.” (Under Review).
Abstract: Proponents of ontological interpretations of Kant’s distinction between appearances (phenomena) and things in themselves (noumena) are attracted to the view that we can know (wissen) things in themselves exist even if they are non-cognizable (nicht-erkennbar). I argue that elements of Kant’s theory of knowledge (Wissen) – namely, his theory of the epistemic justification of assertoric judgments – together with his theory of human cognition (Erkenntnis), entail the existence of things in themselves are unknowable (unwissbar) (i.e. the unknowable existence thesis). First, I demonstrate that four theoretical arguments for the existence of things in themselves fail. Second, I provide two philosophical arguments for the unknowable existence thesis. The first extrapolates from the failures of the four theoretical arguments discussed above. The second argues from Kant’s theory of the justification of assertoric judgments, in conjunction with his theory of human cognition. Third, I provide a textual argument for the unknowable existence thesis, namely from Kant’s assertion that the concept of a noumenon is problematic. I end the paper by defending the unknowable existence thesis from two objections: (1) Kant offers theoretical arguments for the existence of things in themselves, and (2) Kant often talks as if things in themselves exist.
“Kantian Intuitions, A priori Intuitions, and Trendelenburg’s ‘Neglected’ Alternative.” (Under Revision)
Abstract: In the expositions, Kant argues our original representations of space and time are a priori intuitions. From this, he concludes things in themselves are non-spatiotemporal. Famously, F.A. Trendelenburg argued Kant’s argument for the non-spatiotemporality of things in themselves neglects an alternative – that space and time are both subjective and objective – and, therefore, is invalid. I argue Kant’s argument is not invalid, because the nature of Kantian intuitions entails that an a priori intuition must refer to exclusively subjective things, which cannot be things in themselves. Moreover, the property content of the concepts of space and time (i.e. their intensions) is derived from the referents of the a priori intuitions of space and time, respectively. Consequently, the concepts of space and time can only take into their extensions objects that possess exclusively subjective properties, none of which things in themselves can possess.