Kant’s Knowledge of the Non-cognizability of Things in Themselves
Kant’s claim that things in themselves are non-cognizable is often regarded to be self-defeating, if not outright inconsistent with Kant’s theoretical philosophy. For, since ‘things in themselves are non-cognizable’ is a claim about things in themselves, it would seem that, if the claim is true, then the claim is unknowable. In ‘Kant’s Account of Cognition’, Eric Watkins and Marcus Willascheck argue that, for Kant, there is a crucial distinction between what is meant by ‘cognition’ (‘Erkenntnis’) and what is meant by ‘knowledge’ (‘Wissen’). The distinction they make is useful in addressing Kant’s knowledge of the non-cognizability of things in themselves. Notably, under Kant’s theory of human knowledge (Wissen), and under his theory of human cognition (Erkenntnis), the cognition (Erkenntnis) of objects is one means by which humans can acquire knowledge (Wissen). However, it is not the only means. For instance, conceptual analysis grounds analytic knowledge. Therefore, if, under Kant’s theory of knowledge, ‘things in themselves are non-cognizable’ can be grounded without appealing to an act in which we cognize things in themselves, then, not only is the claim consistent with Kant’s theoretical philosophy, but it is knowable under his theory of (human) knowledge. I will argue that claims about things in themselves are knowable under Kant’s theory of knowledge, if (1) the claim is logically entailed by a set of epistemically justified statements, j, (2) j includes at least one synthetic judgment, and (3) j includes at least one analytic truth of things in themselves. Moreover, I argue that, given the expositions, ‘things in themselves are non-cognizable’ is logically entailed by such a set of justified statements.
Thinking Things in Themselves and the Non-actual Application of the Categories
In “Kant on the Inapplicability of the Categories to Things in Themselves“, Markus Kohl argues that things in themselves cannot possess any properties corresponding to the categories. This is because, on Kant’s cognitive theory, the categories cannot be applied to things in themselves on Kant’s cognitive theory. I agree that the actual application of the categories is impossible on Kant’s cognitive theory, since, on that theory, things in themselves cannot be sensibly intuited – a necessary condition for the actual application of concepts to an object. However, Kohl does not properly differentiate between (1) the performance of an actual application of a concept, (2) whether a concept actually applies, and (3) the non-actual application of a concept. The performance of an actual application of a concept involves a cognitive act by which an intuited object is subsumed under a concept. The question of whether a concept actually applies is the metaphysical question of whether an object belongs to the extension of that concept – the answer to which is independent of whether such an object is being intuited or is intuitable. The non-actual application of a concept involves the subsumption of one concept under another in a judgment. Such an application is possible only if the judgment is non-contradictory.
I argue that when Kant claims that the categories are inapplicable to things in themselves, he merely means to be asserting that their actual application is impossible. According to Kant, for all we know, the unschematized categories might actually apply to things in themselves. Moreover, I argue that Kant certainly allows for the non-actual application of the categories to (the concept of) things in themselves (as logically possible entities or properties). This is the sense in which humans can think things in themselves, as opposed to knowing them: the unschematized categories can be non-actually applied to them without contradiction.
The Grounds of Kant’s Distinction Between Appearances and Things in Themselves
There has been a great deal of controversy over the nature of Kant’s distinction between appearances and things in themselves (or things as they appear and things as they are in themselves). The various interpretations, roughly speaking, fall under three categories: (1) the two-world interpretation (in which appearances and things in themselves are construed as two kinds of objects); (2) the one-world ontological interpretation (in which appearances and things in themselves are construed as two kinds of properties possessed by the objects we can cognize; and (3) the epistemic one-world interpretation (in which appearance-talk and thing-in-itself-talk refers to two different cognitive relations we can have with objects we cognize. On my view, both ontological and epistemic interpretations are present in the Critique of Pure Reason.
I argue that the ontological distinction is grounded upon Kant’s argument for the transcendental ideality of space and time. Whatever else may be true of appearances, Kant’s central commitment is that appearances are fundamentally modifications of the forms and states of sensibility. Kant’s commitment to this sense of ‘appearance’ can be traced back to Kant’s Inaugural Dissertation, as a descendant of Kant’s notion of a thing as it appears. The notion of a thing in itself, in the ontological sense, can also be traced back to Kant’s Inaugural Dissertation, as a descendant of Kant’s notion of a thing as it is. Conceptually, a thing in itself exists irrespective of any relation to discursive cognitive faculties, and the properties that inhere in it are possessed irrespective of any such relation. I argue that, in this ontological sense, things in themselves, in the Critique of Pure Reason, must be understood as logically possible entities whose existences are necessarily unknown by discursive cognizers. By my lights, there is room in Kant’s account for the empirical objects we cognize to have properties in themselves – that is, have properties inhering in them independently of any cognitive relation with discursive cognitive faculties. However, in the Critique of Pure Reason, the inherence of these properties must be understood as being merely logically possible.
I argue that the epistemic distinction is grounded upon the thesis that sensibility and the understanding are separable faculties. As a result, the very same empirical objects cognized through the a priori forms of sensibility and the schematized categories can be thought merely through the unschematized categories. This epistemic distinction can also be traced back to Kant’s Inaugural Dissertation, as the descendant of Kant’s distinction between phenomena and noumena – phenomena being those objects cognized through sensibility, and noumena being those objects cognized through the understanding alone. By my lights, Kant could have prevented a good deal of confusion if he would have reserved ‘phenomena’ and ‘noumena’ for the two ways we can consider objects (e.g. objects considered as phenomena vs. objects considered as noumena). The primary difference between the epistemic distinction as it occurs in the Inaugural Dissertation and as it occurs in the Critique of Pure Reason is that, in the Inaugural Dissertation, Kant maintains that objects can be cognized solely through the understanding, whereas, in the Critique, the understanding cannot cognize objects without the aid of sensibility.
Genuine Moral Dilemmas and the Moral Law
Prima facie, genuine moral dilemmas seem to have occurred in the past and seem likely to occur again in the future. By ‘genuine moral dilemma’, I mean a situation in which it is physically impossible for an agent to meet all of her moral obligations. However, Kant, rightly or wrongly, maintained that the Categorical Imperative never came into conflict with itself, in which case there are only apparent moral dilemmas. And utilitarian theories certainly do not admit genuine moral dilemmas, since either one action maximizes utility or multiple actions maximize utility (because they produce the same utility). In the former case, it maintains that your moral obligation is to pick that action. In the latter case, it is morally arbitrary which of the utility-maximizing actions you pick. If there exist genuine moral dilemmas, the Principle of Utility certainly does not capture the moral law, nor does the Categorical Imperative (given Kant’s assumption). I investigate necessary components of the moral law under the assumptions that it does allow for the possibility of genuine moral dilemmas.
Kant’s Conceptualism and His Argument Against Empiricism
Traditionally, Kant is read as a conceptualist. That is, he is read as requiring the application of concepts for the awareness of objects. However, this reading of Kant has been challenged in the recent literature. I argue that Kant must be a conceptualist, because his attack against empiricism relies upon conceptualism. That is, empiricism cannot account for our rich experience, because it does not allow for any a priori concepts to act as rules for associating any given set of sense data with any other given set.
‘Ought’ and Obligation: ‘Ought’ Implies Value, Not Can
Pre-theoretically, it seems that, if it is true you ought to do something, then you are obligated to do it. However, I argue that oughtness is not sufficient for grounding an obligation. Value, by itself, grounds the truth of ought-statements. Since things are valuable regardless of the possible actions physically available to an agent, the truth values of ought-statements with respect to a valuable thing remains the same no matter the actions physically available to an agent. Therefore, ‘ought’ does not imply ‘can’. However, if a person fails to act how she ought to act, for the reason that it is physically impossible for her to act that way, intuitively she is not obligated to do what she ought to do.
H2O is Not Water: When Direct Reference Fails to Secure A posteriori Necessity
Famously, Hillary Putnam argued that H2O is water by drawing on his Twin Earth hypothetical. Twin Earth is just like Earth, except the chemical profile of the clear potable liquid filling lakes, oceans, etc. on Twin Earth is not H2O; it is XYZ. Assume all the other attributes between the clear potable liquid on Earth are the same as the clear potable liquid on Twin Earth. Putnam maintains that scientists from Earth visiting Twin Earth would maintain that Twin Earth’s clear potable liquid is not water, for the reason that its chemical profile is XYZ. This, however, is question-begging. For the scientists might claim, instead, that water can be constituted by more than one chemical profile, namely by at least H2O and XYZ. In this paper, I make the case that XYZ constitutes water. Falling under the kinds H2O and XYZ is a matter of an object possessing
Falling under the kinds H2O and XYZ is a matter of an object possessing a certain set of microfeatures, whereas falling under the kind Water is a matter of an object possessing certain macrofeatures. Accordingly, empirical evidence cannot rule out the possibility that water is multirealizable. Even if I am wrong in the specific case of water, the more general point stands. Empirical evidence cannot rule out the metaphysical possibility of the multirealizability of macrofeatures, simply because it shows, in the actual world, that those macrofeatures always supervene on such-and-such microfeatures.
Lumpl, Goliath, and Immaterial Parts and Properties
It is metaphysically possible for a lump of clay, Lumpl, and a statue, Goliath, to come into existence at the same time, go out of existence at the same time, and occupy the exact same space for the whole duration. However, lumps of clay and statues have different persistence criteria. For instance, lumps of clay survive being flattened, whereas the statute of David would not. Therefore, no lump of clay is identical to a statue. This means that Lumpl and Goliath are numerically distinct objects occupying the same space for their entire existences. It is wildly counterintuitive for two concrete objects to occupy the exact same space for their whole duration. My solution to this puzzle is that all parts of Lumpl are material parts of Goliath, but Goliath has additional immaterial parts that Lumpl does not have, or, minimally, has additional immaterial properties that Lumpl does not have.
Slave Morality and the Development of Nietzsche’s Sovereign Individual
Nietzsche makes a distinction between slave morality and noble morality. Prima facie, it would seem that Nietzsche, at least for himself (and a few others), advocates for noble morality and opposes slave morality. However, I argue that, to the extent Nietzsche values (his notion of) sovereign individuals, he must regard slave morality to be instrumentally valuable. For slave morality is a necessary condition for the existence of sovereign individuals, because, on Nietzsche’s view, slave morality equips people with the psychological tools that are necessary for being autonomous.
The Tyranny of Truth: Moralism and the Threshold View
This project is aimed at non-academics and is something I will likely be unable to put much effort into for several more years. Unfortunately, an article has already uses ‘The Tyranny of Truth’ for its title. However, to my mind, no other title is more suitable for my project. Thus, I have included a subtitle to differentiate it.
In any case, the project begins by discussing the notion of truth and truth-values and why human beings care to know the truth and care for their beliefs to have the truth-value of true. From there, it discusses methodology, and how the intellect (or a priori knowlege) is foundational to all knowing at all, and the shortcomings of treating the scientific method as if it were the only way of ascertaining knowledge. I also discuss some philosophical puzzles with the aim of illuminating general philosophical methodology and how philosophical investigation can aid us in coming to the know the world around us. The point of these discussions is to prepare the reader for an investigation into moral realism (i.e. the position that some moral-ought-propositions are true irrespective of our judgments or feelings on the issue).
Thus, the next major section is to make a case for moral realism and to tease out some, if not all, of the elements of the moral law. It begins by considering ordinary cases in which ought-propositions – namely, those intended to determine our actions – are assented to or denied. That is, it examines what we consider when evaluating the truth-value of those propositions. Specifically, we evaluate ought-propositions on the basis of whether something important (i.e. valuable) is at stake. From this, I argue that moral realism is correct if there exist things that are intrinsically important/valuable. And, I further argue, that our ordinary experiences of the world are inconsistent with there being nothing intrinsically (dis)important. Thus, moral realism follows.
I also examine the nature of moral obligation. Contra utilitarianism, I argue that our moral obligation is to each and every obligator (including ourselves), such that we are to ensure that each has (and continues to have) an existence worth having (what I call ‘the threshold view). Because we care for the truth, once we discover the truth of our moral obligations, we are enburdened with the impossible task of ensuring the well-being of each obligator. The impossibility of the task does not alleviate the burden, because the conditions of obligation are filled and well-being is intriniscally valuable. Hence the reason why truth is tyrannical.
The next major section expounds upon the consequences of this particular moral realist position. Specifically, it considers it as the only non-arbitrary grounds for legitimatizing the exercise of political power and, therefore, the only grounds for legitimatizing that exercise of power. And it considers what an economy must, minimally, succeed in doing in order to be legitimate; or, alternatively, what policies, minimally speaking, must be put in place if an economy fails to meet that condition.